Abstract-A hackfest named SWaT Security Showdown (S 3 ) has been organized consecutively for two years. S 3 has enabled researchers and practitioners to assess the effectiveness of methods and products aimed at detecting cyber attacks launched in real-time on an operational water treatment plant, namely, Secure Water Treatment (SWaT). In S 3 independent attack teams design and launch attacks on SWaT while defence teams protect the plant passively and raise alarms upon attack detection. Attack teams are scored according to how successful they are in performing attacks based on specific intents while the defense teams are scored based on the effectiveness of their methods to detect the attacks. This paper focuses on the first two instances of S 3 and summarizes the benefits of hackfest and the performance of an attack detection mechanism, named Water Defense, that was exposed to attackers during S 3 .
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [39] considered in this work are complex interconnected systems deployed to control and monitor, among others, critical infrastructures such as water treatment and electric power systems [17] . The increase in successful cyber attacks on public infrastructure [14] , [29] , [48] , and other mostly unsuccessful attempts [25] , has raised the importance of deploying cyber defense mechanisms in ICS. Attackers are often bypassing the defense mechanisms (prevention and detection) by exploiting software and hardware vulnerabilities or through social engineering. Therefore, it becomes important to look for ways of detecting process anomalies in an ICS caused by an attacker who has gained unauthorized entry. Water Defense [5] , referred to in this paper as WD, is one such anomaly detection mechanism.
The technology underlying WD has been described and experimentally evaluated by the authors [1] , [4] . This paper describes an independent supplementary assessment of WD based on attacks launched by teams of attackers. The assessment was carried out over two consecutive years in an event labeled "hackfest (S 3 )" [9] , [35] , [36] . The event was organized by a team of faculty, students, and staff at the Singapore University of Technology and Design. Several attack and defense teams [9] , [35] , [36] participated in S 3 . The attack teams designed and launched attacks on SWaTthe system used for assessment of WD by the authors. This paper is focused on analysis of data used for assessing the performance of WD in detecting process anomalies resulting from the attacks. Details of S 3 are in Section IV. The following two research questions were the focus of S 3 with respect to WD.
RQ1: How do attackers compromise the security of an ICS?
RQ2: How effective is WD in detecting attacks launched by independent attack teams?
Contributions: This paper (a) summarizes the performance of the WD mechanism during two consecutive S 3 events and (b) reports on observations and lessons learned from the experience; all attacks launched during S 3 are reported. Information presented in this work will likely be valuable to researchers attempting to assess the performance of process anomaly detection methods other than WD. A complete list of the invariants (see Section III) used in WD, and the S tors. Control devices include Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstations, and Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) devices. Network devices include network switches and access points. The PLCs, SCADA, and HMI monitor and control the physical process. Communication channels in the network act as a bridge between the physical process and the control devices. Communication channels communicate the state of physical process to controllers and control signals to the actuators. PLCs receive data from sensors, compute control actions, and apply these actions to specific devices. The PLCs in an ICS can be viewed collectively as a distributed control system that transforms the state of the process through the use of sensors and actuators. 
B. SWaT: Architecture and components
SWaT [30] , [40] is a testbed for water treatment. It is used to investigate the response to cyber attacks and experiment with novel designs of defense mechanisms such as the ones described in [3] . The architecture and components in SWaT are described next.
Stages in SWaT:
As shown in Figure 2 , SWaT consists of six stages labeled Stage 1 through Stage 6. Each stage is controlled by its own set of PLCs. Stage 1 controls the inflow of water to be treated by opening or closing a valve that connects the inlet pipe to the raw water tank (T101). Water from the raw water tank is pumped via a chemical dosing (Stage 2) station to another Ultrafiltration (UF) feed water tank (T301) in Stage 3. In Stage 3 a UF feed pump sends water, via the UF unit, to a Reverse Osmosis (RO) feed water tank (T401) in Stage 4. In Stage 4 an RO feed pump sends water through an ultraviolet dechlorination unit controlled by a PLC. Differential pressure sensors in Stage 3 measure the pressure drop across the UF unit. A backwash cycle is initiated when the pressure drop exceeds 0.4 bar indicating that the membranes need immediate cleaning. Stage 5 contains a PLC to control the Reverse Osmosis (RO) unit that further filters the water using a 2-stage RO process. The output of the RO unit enters storage tanks T601 and T602 in Stage 6. Tank T601 contains the reject from RO and is used to clean the UF unit using a backwash process. Water in tank T602 contains the permeate which is recycled into tank T101 in Stage 1.
Sensors and actuators:
SWaT contains 42 sensors and actuators across the six stages. These include sensors that relate to the dynamics of the process such as water level in tanks, flow indicators, and pressure indicators as well as those for measuring chemical properties of water including pH, conductivity and hardness. Each PLC has its own set of sensors and actuators connected through a ring network. Thus, when a PLC needs to obtain state information from another PLC, it must request such information via a suitable command; the requested data is sent over level 1 network as shown in Figure 3 .
Communications: Figure 3 shows the architecture of the communications infrastructure in SWaT. Each PLC obtains data from sensors associated with the corresponding stage, and controls pumps and valves in its domain. Flow of water across various stages is controlled through opening and closing of valves and turning pumps ON or OFF. Level sensors in each tank enable the PLCs to decide when to turn a pump ON or OFF. Several other sensors are available to check on the physical and chemical properties of water flowing through the six stages. PLCs communicate with each other through a separate network. Communications among sensors, actuators, and PLCs can be via either wired or wireless links controlled manually. Both wired and wireless networks connect PLCs to the physical process and to the HMI and engineering workstation, i.e. the SCADA workstation.
The control network is connected to the SCADA workstation [40] through a wired network using a 16-port switch. The PLCs and SCADA workstation are also connected through a wireless network configured using star topology. Switches located at each stage enable the use of either wired or wireless communications. The communications network is layered into two levels. For each PLC, level 0 refers to the communication layer between sensors, actuators and the PLC. Level 0 network is implemented as a "device level ring" [9] , [43] which includes a Remote IO (RIO) device. The RIO is connected to the physical sensors and actuators. Monitoring and control information is exchanged between the PLC, sensors, and actuators across a Distributed Logical Router (DLR). Level 1 refers to the communication layer among PLCs. This layer is implemented in a star topology and includes a SCADA workstation, an HMI, and a Historian.
Controllers (PLCs):
SWaT is equipped with Allen Bradley ControlLogix PLCs. Therefore, some of the attacks described in the remainder of this paper require consideration of the protocols used by EtherNet/IP [32] for Allen Bradley PLCs. SCADA software is developed with tools from Rockwell automation [8] .
Attack detection mechanisms: As shown in Figure 3 , SWaT contains four attack detection mechanisms D1, D2, D3, and Orthogonal Defense Mechanism (ODM) [6] . D1 is based on a modified version of the open source Bro intrusion detection tool [10] . D2 is a set of three commercially available intrusion detection systems that use a mix of process dynamics and other techniques for anomalous process behavior [12] , [24] , [27] . D3 (WD) sits inside PLCs and implements a distributed attack detection mechanism that relies exclusively on process dynamics [1] . The ODM has direct access to sensors and analyses the data received for the existence of process anomaly.
C. An illustrative attack on SWaT
Consider Stage 1 of SWaT in Figure 2 . This stage has a motorized valve labeled MV101 which, when open, causes water to flow into tank T101. The inflow into T101 is measured by flow meter FIT101 and the water level by a level sensor labeled LIT101. Pump P101 sends water to the next stage. Flow meter FIT201 measures the outflow of water from Stage 1 to Stage 3. PLC1 receives the LIT101 reading and controls the motorized valve MV101. Similarly, PLC1 receives LIT301 readings from PLC3 and controls pump P101.
Tanks T101 and T301 have four markers each labeled Low (L), Low Low (LL), High (H), and High High (HH). Each marker corresponds to a specific value of water level in the tank. These markers are used by the corresponding PLCs to control the states of motorized valves and pumps. Thus, for example, when the water level in T101 reaches L, PLC1 opens MV101 and closes it when the level reaches H. When water level in T301 reaches L, PLC1 turns P101 ON and turns it OFF when the level reaches H. The following example illustrates the impact of compromising level sensor LIT101 with the intent of damaging pump P101.
Example: Consider an attack where the attacker's intention is to underflow T101 and damage P101 by making it run without any incoming water. The attack is launched on LIT101 with Stage 1 in the following state: LIT301: 955mm, MV101: Closed, P101: OFF; UF is operational and therefore water level in tank T301 is decreasing. Assume now that the attacker sets LIT101 reading to a constant value of 790mm. In this attack even though the water level in T101 is changing (decreasing), PLC1 receives a constant value. After a while when LIT301 reaches L, pump P101 is turned ON by PLC1. However, the actual water level in tank T101 is lower than L, say at LL. This leads to the outflow from the pump being reduced to less than the intended flow rate. Pump P101 runs dry when there is no water in T101 and will eventually get damaged unless a corrective action is taken. Figure 4 shows the water level in tank T101 during the attack. It can be observed that the outflow increases gradually when the attack is removed. Note that the sudden drop in the value of LIT101 soon after attack removal corresponds to the fact that the PLC begins to receive the correct measurement Figure 5 shows the change in flow rate during the attack as measured by flow meter FIT201. The two arrows indicate the start of reduction of outflow from T101. At around 10 seconds there is no water flowing from P101 even though the pump is ON. At this point the pump becomes noisy and the flow rate reduces to zero. If not removed, this attack may lead to pump damage due to overheating. Of course, a mechanical cut off at the pump would avoid such damage.
The above example shows how an attacker could potentially damage a pump by changing the sensor values and actuator states. More complex attacks, mentioned in Section VI, can be designed and launched to reduce the chances of being detected.
III. OVERVIEW OF WD
WD is a mechanism to detect process anomalies. A process is considered anomalous when it deviates from its expected behavior. WD detects such anomalies through the use of invariants. An invariant [4] is a condition among physical and/or chemical properties of the process that must hold whenever an ICS is in a given state. At a given time instant, sensor measurements of a suitable set of such properties constitute the observable state of the physical process as known to the ICS.
The invariants serve as checkers of the system state. These are coded and the code placed inside each PLC used for attack detection. The checker code is added to the control code that already exists in each PLC. The PLC executes the code in a cyclic manner. In each cycle, data from the sensors is obtained, control actions computed and applied when necessary, and the invariants checked against the state variables or otherwise. Distributing the attack detection code among various controllers adds to the scalability of the proposed method. During S 3 the implementation was located inside the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) as well as embedded in the communication network.
Two types of invariants were considered: state dependent (SD) and state agnostic (SA). While both types use states to define relationships that must hold, the SA invariants are independent of any state based guard while SD invariants are. An SD invariant is true when the plant is in a given state; an SA invariant is always true.
A. State-Dependent (SD) invariants
Consider, for example, the case when the motorized valve MV101 is Open. In this case, the flow rate indicator FIT101 must provide a non-zero reading to the PLC. This physical fact leads to the following state-dependent invariant: MV101=Open =⇒ FIT101< δ, where δ denotes a threshold indicating flow. Note that an SD invariant may include conditions from across the various stages of SWaT thus enabling distributed detection of attacks. Derivation of SD invariants is based on the design of the ICS and is described in [4] .
B. State-Agnostic (SA) invariants
Under normal system operation, an SA invariant must always be true regardless of the system state. One SA invariant was derived for each tank in SWaT to detect attacks that affect the flow of water into and out of a tank. These invariants are based on the flow of water and water level in a tank, and hence are identical in terms of the mathematical relationship that they capture.
As an example of an SA invariant, consider the water level in a tank. At time instant k+1, the water level in T101 depends on the level at time k and the inflow and outflow at instant k. This relationship is captured in the following idealized discrete time model of the tank,
where u i (k) and u o (k) denote the inflow and outflow rates at time k, and α is a proportionality constant that converts flow rate to change in level using the tank dimensions. x(k) is the true state of the water level. Let y(k) denote the sensor measurement of the water level,x(k) an estimate of the level sensor reading, and a threshold based on experimentation. Based on Eqn. 1, the statistics obtained experimentally, and converting the true states to their estimates, the following invariant is derived to test whether or not the tank filling process is anomalous. 
IV. SWAT SECURITY SHOWDOWN (S
This section presents details of the two S 3 [36] events including guidelines and selected information on participants. In S 3 the attackers are challenged to realise concrete goals in SWaT. Points earned by an attack team are weighted based on the capabilities needed to launch the attack and the number of defence mechanisms successfully bypassed during the attack. The goal was to meet as many pre-defined challenges as possible within the pre-allocated time.
Information disclosed to the attack teams: Technical details on SWaT, such as network architecture, protocols and devices used, are released to the attackers one month prior to their arrival for participation in the event. Publicly available white papers on mechanisms deployed by the defence teams are shared with each attack team.
Information disclosed to the defenders: S 3 organizers worked closely with the defense teams to integrate their defence mechanisms into SWaT. Information about the normal operation of SWaT was disclosed to the defenders to enable them to finetune their detection systems and reduce false alarms as much as they could.
Attacker profiles: Attack teams were asked to select from a set of attacker profiles [34] . The following attacker profiles were available: cyber-criminal, insider, or a combination of both. An attacker profile is intended to restrict availability of resources and limit the access rights of the attackers as shown in Table I .
A. S 3 -2016
Attack teams included three from industry and three from academia. Similarly, there were three defense teams from the industry and three from academia. During the live phase, held at the SWaT testbed, all six [35] defence mechanisms were simultaneously in place. Each team was given 12 hours for passive reconnaissance and team was assigned a 3-hour slot during which they were able to launch attacks.
B. S 3 -2017
Attack teams included one from industry and four from academia. There were two defense teams from the industry and two from academia. Each attack team was given two sessions [36] of four hours each to conduct reconnaissance on the testbeds. During these sessions, various attacks were prepared and tested with the assistance of the SWaT laboratory engineer. During the actual event, each team was given two hours to demonstrate their attacks that were prepared previously. Attack 
Profile Constraints
Cyber-criminal Limited number of attempts to realize a goal.
Physical access not allowed; manual manipulation of the sensors and actuators are not allowed.
Direct connection to PLCs using any software such as Allen Bradley's Studio5000, not allowed.
Insider Physical access to SWaT allowed; manual manipulation of the sensors and actuators are allowed.
Allowed to alter the network topology Direct connection to PLCs using any software such as Allen Bradley's Studio5000, allowed. 
C. Attack targets
The attack teams were given a list of components and subsystems in SWaT that could serve as the target of their attacks. Table II lists the targets available to the attack teams. Table II has two kinds of attacks: physical process attacks and sensor data attacks. In physical process attacks, an attacker's objective is to alter the physical process. In the case of sensor data attacks, an attacker's objective is to alter the sensor or actuator tags during communication or in the Historian.
V. PREPARATION FOR S 3
To prepare for S 3 -2016, an earlier version of WD was extended to all six stages of SWaT. This extension required the generation of invariants across all stages, coding of the invariants, and placement of the code inside [1] the six PLCs. The modified WD was tested on SWaT by running the plant under various operating conditions. Based on lessons learned during S 3 -2016, several new invariants were generated, coded, and added to the PLCs. For S 3 -2017, we decided to use an additional monitoring system placed outside the PLCs. This system collects data from the Historian and evaluates the invariants. All invariants were implemented in a Linux environment using a Piwebclient API to talk to the Historian. This new implementation is referred to as WDH.
The invariants in WD are coded using ladder logic and structured text, while those in WDH in Python. Both implementations use the same set of invariants; the difference is in their placement. The Historian may not get all the data and commands that flow across the PLCs, sensors, and actuators. However, as WDH gets its data directly from the Historian, it has access to information flowing across SCADA workstation and the Historian. This information may be compromised by an attacker and is not available to the PLC.
A. Scope of WD
WD is designed to detect process anomalies. Thus, any abnormal behavior in the water treatment process in SWaT ought to be detected by WD. However, there could be attacks that do not cause the process to deviate from its normal behavior but lead to undesirable consequences. An example of such an attack is one intended to deface the screen on the SCADA workstation or the HMI. Such an attack will not be detected by WD. Attacks that may cause process anomaly but only after an attack has been removed from the system may also not be detected by WD. Denial of Service is one such attack.
B. Scope of WDH
WDH and WD use the same set of invariants. However, the placement of WDH could lead to a difference in detection capabilities of the two defense mechanisms. WDH gets its data from Historian while WD directly from the PLC. Data that is not programmed to be logged in the Historian will not be accessible to WDH. Thus any anomaly that requires such data will likely not be detected by WDH. Similarly, attacks that manipulate data entering the Historian or SCADA may not be visible to WD. Thus, while the two invariant-based process anomaly detection mechanisms are identical in the invariants they use, their placement in SWaT is expected to result in different performance in detecting attacks.
VI. S 3 ATTACKS
The attacks launched by teams participating in the two S 3 events are described next.
A. S 3 -2016 Attacks
All attacks designed and launched during S 3 -2016 are enumerated in Table III . Three attacks selected from Table III are described next. Details of all attacks are available in [9] . Of the 18 attacks in Table III, 4 and 16 are cyber criminal attacks and the remaining are insider attacks. Table III ) the attacker's intention was to deface the SCADA workstation screen and hence prevent the operator from observing plant state. The cyber-criminal attacker model was used to design this attack. To realize the intention, the attacker launched an ARP poisoning Man-in-the-Middle attack in two steps. In the first step all traffic intended for HMI was redirected to the SCADA workstation. In the second step, this redirected traffic was dropped and thus no packets were received at the SCADA workstation. This led to the screen on the workstation becoming completely gray and no state information was displayed. This attack was not detected by WD as it did not lead to any process anomaly. It is an ARP spoofing attack, and not a traditional DoS attack. As part of the DoS attack, the attacker targeted the PLC and sent millions of packets at a time. This led to the same effect as would be the case when an ARP spoofing attack is performed on SCADA.
DoS attack on SCADA: In this attack (attack 4 in
Manipulation of the chemical dosing pump: Intention of the attacker in this case (attack 14 in Table III ) was to manipulate the pH of water entering Stage 3 of SWaT. The insider-attacker model was used in the design of this attack. This attack was executed in two steps. In the first step, PLC 2 was set to manual mode. Note that in manual mode the plant operator can directly control the actuators, e.g., the dosing pumps in this case. In the second step, the attacker altered the chemical dosing process in the Pre-treatment Stage 2 of SWaT by interacting directly with the HMI interface and overriding the commands sent by the PLC. WD was able to detect this attack because the setpoints changed by the attacker were different from those set in WD.
DoS to PLC by SYN flooding:
The intention of the attacker in this case (attack 16 in Table III ) was to disable the HMI so that an operator is unable to view or control the plant operation. The insider-attacker model was used in the design of this attack. In this way the attacker had an access to the administrator account and the associated tools. The attacker performed a SYN flooding attack on Ethernet/IP server of PLC1.
As a result of this DoS attack, the HMI was unable to obtain the current state values to display, and would instead display 0 or * characters. WD was unable to detect this attack physical process as not affected. During the attack period, PLC was controlling the process as expected. Such attacks, while not altering process behavior, may impede supervision of the process in an operational plant.
B. S 3 -2017 Attacks
All attacks designed and launched during S 3 -2017 are enumerated in Table IV . Selected attacks from Table III are described next. Details of all attacks are available in [20] . Of the 31 attacks in Table IV, 17 can be classified as cyber criminal attacks and the remaining as insider attacks ( Figure I ). All attacks launched during S 3 -2016 and S 3 -2017 are listed and categorized in Table V. Control of the chemical dosing system through a Python script (Pycomm): The objective of this attack (attack 15 in Table IV ) was to change chemical dosing at the end of the dechlorination system (Stage 4). First, the attackers compromised Virtual Network Computing (VNC). Then they used a Python script (Pycomm) and Wireshark to gain access to the HMI. After gaining access to the HMI through the compromised VNC, the cybercriminal attacker used Wireshark to capture the packets flowing between the HMI and PLC4. The controller tags were retrieved by an analysis of the packets. The attackers changed the data associated with these tags to control the chemical dosing function using the Pycomm framework.
Control of PLC through the Bridged Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) at Level 0: the objective of this attack was (attack 16 in Table IV ) to change the commands and values that PLC1 receives and sends. First, the attackers configured a bridge between the RIO and PLC1 using Netfilterqueue and Scapy. The attack was launched at two network levels. An analysis on the network traffic revealed the packets that the attackers should edit. As the target of this attack was the water level in T101, the attackers set it to a constant value to hide from PLC1 the rise in water level in T101. Before a packet was forwarded, Netfilterqueue rerouted it into a queue which can be read and modified by the Python script. To prevent all packets from entering the queue, in order not to disrupt other processes, iptables was used to identify the targeted packets entering the queue. Using Scapy and a custom dissector, the attacker edited the payload of the targeted packet which was then forwarded to its original destination.
Control of Historian through the Aircrack WiFi:
The objective of this attack was (attack 17 in Table IV ) to compromise the data stored in the Historian. Attackers performed crack WiFi password, ARP poisoning, and MiTM payload manipulation using Aircrack and Ettercap. As PLC1 was operating in the wireless mode, the cybercriminal attacker used Aircrack to obtain the password for connecting to the ICS Access Point (AP). ARP poisoning was executed to reroute traffic between PLC1 and the Historian through the attacker's rogue terminal. The attackers then used an Ettercap filter to manipulate the network packets. The attackers changed the tag corresponding to LIT101 to an arbitrary value before releasing the packets to the Historian.
Control of pressure through the Server Message Block (SMB):
The objective of this attacks was (attack 18 in Table IV in Factory Talk software from Rockwell, and in Microsoft's Server Message Block (SMB), was used by the attackers to obtain files from the HMI. As the HMI was running Windows CE, it has a vulnerability that allows an attacker's terminal to execute arbitrary code on the HMI. Thus the attackers were able to retrieve the files to create a copy of the workstation. From the copied workstation, the attackers manually changed the state of the valves in Stage 3 such that the differential pressure across the UF unit as measured by DPIT301, became dangerously high. The attackers closed valves MV301, MV302, and MV303, and opened MV304.
Control of water level in the tank through the Metasploit VNC Scanner: Objective of this attack was (attack 19 in Table IV) to change the water level in tank T101. The attackers used Metasploit VNC authentication None scanner to obtain access to the VNC server without password protection and to check for nodes running a VNC Server. Once the scanner detected the VNC Server running without any authentication, the attackers penetrated into the server through a VNC Client connection. As the VNC Server was hosting the HMI which Control of a pump through a rogue router: The objective of this attack (attack 20 in Table IV) was to disrupt the control of pump P501. The attackers used Evil twin (rogue access point) method using KisMAC, a password cracking tool, 3vilTwinAttacker, Telnet, and Scapy. The attackers used KisMAC to scan for wireless networks in the ICS. Once the targeted wireless network was identified, the attackers used dictionary attack to crack the password. After the password was cracked, the attackers created a rogue wireless router with a similar SSID and configuration. They then sent a deauthentication packet to disassociate PLC5 and the original router. The attackers used Telnet to log into the original router and shut it down. Scapy was then used to modify the packets to turn the pump on.
VII. RESULTS Tables VI and VII summarize the response of WD and WDH to the attacks launched during the two S 3 events. Recall that both WD and WDH contain exactly the same set of invariants. In WD the invariants are coded and placed inside the PLCs whereas in WDH the invariants are coded and placed at the Historian. WDH did not exist during S 3 -2016 and hence the response of WDH is available only for attacks launched during S 3 -2017.
A. S 3 -2016 results
We note from Table VI that 10 out of 18 attacks were detected immediately while the remaining eight attacks were not detected. Six of the eight undetected attacks did not lead to process anomaly during the observation period and hence did not violate any invariant. This outcome is expected as the invariants in WD are designed to detect process anomaly.
Consider attack 2, ARP spoofing, in Table III . This is a DoS attack on HMI. It leads to defacing the screen on the HMI, or displaying incorrect information, thereby preventing an operator from knowing the actual plant state. However, the attack does not cause process anomaly and hence is not detected as it does not violate any invariant. Similar logic can be used to explain why the other attacks in Table VI are not detected.
It is important to note that a DoS attack, when given enough time to evolve and be launched at an appropriate state of the plant, may impact physical process behavior. In such a case one or more invariants may detect the attack. One such attack is 16 in Table VI . This attack prevented the Historian from receiving data from PLC1. However, if this attack was left active for a longer period, it would prevent PLC1 from sending appropriate commands to the actuators, e.g., to MV101 or P101. In turn this would have led to process anomaly. Not enough data is available to conclude with certainty whether or not this attack would be detected by WD if active for sufficient time.
Two single point [2] attacks were not detected by WD. In one attack (attack 6 in Table III ) the adversary altered the status of valve MV301. Under normal circumstances this valve is opened during the backwash process. However, the attacker opened it when there was no backwash. Hence the attack did not affect the physical process except in changing the valve status. No invariant was violated due to this attack because the backwash process, i.e., Stage 6, is not included in this case study. The second single point attack (attack 17 in Table III ) was performed on chemical dosing pump P203 while the other pump P204 was running. Note that under normal circumstances only one of these two pumps is supposed to be running while the other remains as a backup. Subsequently the attacker shut down pump P204. This attack was not detected because there were no invariants that related to the chemical properties of water.
Although the overall performance of WD was below 100%, it did detect all attacks within its scope except two (attacks 6 and 17 in Table III ) as mentioned earlier. Table II and in Table IV) are not detected by both WD and WDH. This is because registers inside a PLC save the previous values received from the sensors, and the PLC continues to execute the control code. The invariants also use the same values stored in the PLC registers and hence do not raise an alert.
B. S 3 -2017 results
In general, PLCs send to the Historian, via the SCADA workstation, the data received from the sensors. When a PLC does not have updated values during the attack period, it is obvious that the Historian also receives the same stale values. This is the reason why WDH also did not detect attacks related to RIO/Display. Note that the RIO/Display attacks were launched and remained active only for a few seconds. During this period the PLC did not update the current sensor values coming through the RIO. If the same attack is performed for a longer duration, the PLC would update the data received from the sensors. Doing so would likely lead to WD and WDH detecting the RIO attacks.
Attacks launched on the Historian were detected by WDH but not by WD. This variance is due to the fact that data in these attacks is manipulated at the Historian. Thus, invariants in a PLC do not have access to the manipulated data and hence the invariants in WD do not raise any alert. All attacks targeting a PLC are detected by WD and WDH.
WD: Detection of physical process attacks: All attacks on valves, pressure sensor, and level sensors were detected. Three out of four attacks on the chemical dosing process pumps were detected. An example of a detected attack is when the attackers took control of pump P301 (attack 20 in Table IV) through a Python script (Pycomm) to raise the pressure in the UF unit, measured by sensor DPIT301, to a dangerous level. WD immediately raised an alarm. This invariant ensured that pump P301 must be OFF when the pressure at DPIT301 was above a threshold. During the attack the invariant was violated as the pump was not turned off while DPIT301 indicated readings that were above the threshold. Consequently an alarm was raised immediately. In certain cases, multiple alarms were raised due to the violation of one or more invariants. For example, when level sensor LIT101 was compromised, the invariants corresponding to this sensor were violated and raised alarms.
WD: Detection of sensor data attack: WD detected attacks on HMI/SCADA and PLC values because these attacks directly compromised the physical processes. These attacks either compromised chemical dosing, water tank levels, or pump status through hacking of the HMI/SCADA or PLC. Hence, the robustness of WD in detecting unusual physical process behavior was found effective in these attacks. On the other hand, WD was unable to detect insider attacks that pulled out RIO cables. This is because WD triggers an alarm only when the invariants are violated. Under normal circumstance, for a period of time, a PLC continues to execute its control code, and any invariant code based on the last known state and/or values. Thus the invariants located inside the PLCs are unable to observe this anomalous behavior.
WDH: Detection of physical process attacks: WDH detected 14 out of 16 physical process attacks.
WDH: Detection of sensor data attacks: WDH detected the attacks on HMI/SCADA and PLC values because these attacks directly compromised the physical processes, albeit with a slightly lower detection rate when compared with the rate of detecting physical process attacks. As with WD, WDH did not detect any attack launched against the Remote I/O by pulling the cables that connect it to the corresponding PLC. WDH fared better in the detection of attacks against the Historian as it was directly accessing data on the Historian server.
If the Historian itself, or data that is input to the Historian is compromised, WDH takes the decision based on the input it receives. A clever and powerful attacker can attack the physical process and modify values entering the Historian and thus deceive WDH. In general, such a situation may arise in all behavioral intrusion detection systems where the detector takes the decision based on incorrect input data. Indeed, data that appears to be "legitimate" could lead the WDH into believing that there is nothing wrong with the physical process though there actually is. However, doing so requires the attacker to continuously manipulate a large number of state variables. For example, consider an attack where the attacker turns a pump, say P101, ON when it should be OFF and (continually) sends the state of the pump as OFF to the Historian and the corresponding PLC. If the pump is OFF then the level of the source and destination tanks must be, respectively, decreasing and increasing at rates determined by the pump characteristics. Creating "legitimate-looking" data thus requires an attacker to manipulate several state variables as explained next. (a) Two state variables that correspond to tank levels. Two sensors (in SWaT) measure these state variables (see Figure 2) . Thus, the attacker must have access to these level sensors. (b) If pump P101 is actually ON while the Historian receives its state as OFF, then FIT201 must show no flow. Thus the attacker will also need to manipulate FIT201 to avoid detection. This argument can be carried forward to subsequent stages to show that many sensors will need to be manipulated by an attacker to "hide" a simple attack such as "change the state of a pump." In summary, yes, incorrect data at the Historian could prevent detection though doing so would be a significant challenge for the attacker due primarily to the distributed nature of the invariants.
VIII. DISCUSSION A. Challenges faced
We faced several challenges during S
3
. For example, after each team's performance, the operator was required to bring SWaT back to a predefined normal state. It was necessary to keep SWaT in a normal state before another team launched attacks. Bringing SWaT to its normal state required: (a) resetting network communications to ensure that all the communication channels are operating as expected, (b) the operator to ensure that all physical processes in SWaT are stable with respect to the control logic, (c) the operator to bring back SWaT to the normal state of that particular device such as a pump or a motorized valve in the case of any physical or manual attacks by the previous team, and (d) that the Historian and SCADA servers were reverted to their original state, i.e, the state that existed prior to the launch of attacks.
B. Research questions
RQ1: How do attackers compromise the security of an ICS? In Section VI we presented and categorized the attacks based on attacker profiles. An attacker can launch physical attacks when inside the plant such as manually operating a motorized valve or tampering with network cabling. Several attacks launched by the attack teams had not been launched by the authors in their evaluation of WD [1] and WDH. Thus, S 3 raised our confidence in the effectiveness of the attack detection mechanisms based on invariants derived from plant designs.
RQ2:
How effective is WD in detecting attacks launched by independent attack teams? As mentioned earlier, while both WD and WDH were found to detect a number of attacks, they did fail in several cases. Given that the invariants derived are intended to detect process anomalies, it is clear that such mechanisms must be used in conjunction with other attack detection tools such as those in [24] , [27] , [21] .
C. Assessment by the authors and by independent teams
Table VIII lists the number of attacks launched by the authors in an experimental evaluation performed prior to S 3 -2016 [1] . Note that the WD detection rate observed by the authors (89%) was higher than the combined rate observed during the two S 3 events (63.26%). The difference in performance is due to different attack vectors used in the three sets of experiments. WDH detection rate observed during S 3 event is (77.41%), which is much higher than the WD detection rate. Some of these attack vectors are explained in Section VI and the remaining may be found in [20] . The data in Table VIII is indicative of the value of organizing S 3 events. Specifically, in the case described in this paper, the two S 3 events led to an increased confidence in the effectiveness of the invariant-based approach in detecting cyber attacks. The hackfests also led to the creation of new types of attack vectors that were not used earlier to assess the performance of WD and WDH in detecting cyber attacks.
D. False alarms
The performance of any attack detection method ought to be assessed using its detection accuracy, i.e. how many of the launched attacks it detects, as well as the rate at which false alarms are raised. During S 3 each team attempted to launch several attacks. The attacks listed in Tables III and IV are the ones that were successful in realizing the stated attacker intent and were scored by the judges. The remaining attacks were not recorded and hence any alarm generated by such attacks was not considered. Some of these unrecorded alarms could be false though no specific claims can be made about their nature.
Since S 3 -2017, the authors have observed no false alarms from WD during normal operation of SWaT. WDH has been in operation since a few weeks prior to S 3 -2017. Again, during the normal operation of SWaT, no alarm has been generated by WDH. This observation should not be construed to imply that an invariant-based attack detection mechanism will not generate any false alarm-in fact it could. However, if the invariants generated are complete in the sense that they accurately capture all aspects of process behavior, and their implementation is correct and tuned properly, the likelihood of false alarms is low.
Even though SWaT is a relatively new plant (2-years since its inauguration at the time of writing this paper), we do observe intermittent failures in a few motorized valves. For example, sometimes MV101 in Stage 1 takes much longer to open than expected by its controlling PLC1. The PLC itself detects such cases. In such a case WD or WDH, depending on the time it takes for the valve to finally open, will raise an alarm. We do not consider this as a false positive simply because whether an anomalous behavior is due to a natural cause, or a cyber attack, cannot be distinguished by WD or WDH. While such distinction is important to make, additional research is needed to distinguish process anomalies due to cyber attacks and those arising due to natural component failures.
E. Benefits of S

3
S
3 exposed the organisers, participants and researchers to how an attacker might design and launch attacks on ICS. Benefits of S 3 include the following. 1) An improved understanding of how an ICS operates and the consequent formulation of new research directions. 2) Opportunity for participants from industry and academia to learn from the event and focus on the limitations of their work. 3) An aid to the ICS management team to observe the defense teams thus leading to possible adoption of technology embedded in WD or WDH.
F. Placement of WD
The placement of WD is another question that ought to be looked into carefully. In this work WD is placed inside PLCs. However, an exceptionally large number of invariants may prevent adding code to the existing control code in a PLC. This may happen due to the computational load requirements on a PLC. This aspect led us to create WDH that is placed on the plant network and gets its data from the Historian to evaluate the invariants.
G. Forensics
One advantage of the invariant-based approach for attack detection appears while determining the area of impact of an attack. When a single invariant is violated, it indicates clearly the source of process anomaly. For example, an alert is generated if valve MV101 is closed when the water in tank T101 is at or below the L level marker. While this alert does not indicate how an attacker entered the system, or if the valve or the level sensor is defective, it does assist in localising the reason for the alert. The analysis becomes a bit more complex when multiple invariants raise alerts. This aspect of an invariant-based detection mechanisms remains to be analyzed in further detail.
H. Attacker capabilities
We do not have any validation of the professionalism of the S 3 attack teams. As mentioned earlier [20] , [35] , [36] , attack teams were from a variety of backgrounds including from the industry and academia from Europe and Asia. During S 3 -2017 one team consisting of four members-all from outside of Singapore-focuses on ethical hacking and cyber-wars involving critical infrastructure. This team is part of a global alliance. The other teams consist of hackers interested in knowing how vulnerabilities in software can be exploited and passes this information to others for improving systems security. Coverage of attacks launched by the attack teams, and attacker profiles, is discussed in Section IV and summarized in Tables I, II , V and VII.
I. Attack trees
It is possible to use attack trees [37] , [42] to model attacks launched during the two hackfests reported in this paper. Doing so would enable mapping each attack to a specific path in the attack tree and reveal which attack paths in SWaT were traversed. Such modeling and analysis has not been attempted in this work and is a possible subject for future research.
IX. RELATED WORK S
3 is a Capture-The-Flag [15] event on ICS. Traditional CTF events generally attract the attention of both industrial and academic teams and currently enjoy increasing popularity as indicated in [15] . The number of such events is gradually increasing [13] , [16] . Such events aid in learning about security vulnerabilities, how these could be exploited, nature of attacks, and strength of the deployed [18] , [33] , [45] defense mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, S 3 is the first CTF style event of its kind in ICS that involves participants from the industry and academia, and focuses on an operational water treatment testbed. The study reported here focuses on cyber attacks on ICS that result in deliberate data and command manipulation. Injection of such attacks in ICS has been studied by several researchers. Attacks have been modeled as noise in sensor data [28] , [47] . Authors previously presented cyber physical attacker model [2] to aid in the design of cyber physical attacks on ICS. Attacker models designed specifically for ICS include a variety of deception attacks including surge, bias, and geometric [11] . Such models have been used in experiments to understand the effectiveness of statistical techniques in detecting cyber attacks.
There exist several techniques, other than the type used in WD, for the detection of process anomalies. CPAC [19] presents stateful detection mechanisms to detect attacks against control systems. The Weaselboard [31] uses PLC backplane to get the sensor data and actuator commands, and analyses them to prevent zero day vulnerabilities. WeaselBoard [31] has a dedicated device, and detects changes in control settings, sensor values, configuration information, firmware, logic, etc.
The invariants in WD use data from multiple stages to enable distributed detection of cyber attacks. Such sensor fusion has been proposed by several researchers. In safety critical cyber physical systems this was reported in [26] . In [38] , it is shown how safety critical systems are interconnected and their complexity. Model based attack detection schemes in water distribution systems was presented in [7] . It uses the Matlab system identification tool to get a model from the data generated in a water distribution system. The data driven model is helpful in detecting process anomalies.
Monitoring the physics of the system has been studied in [22] . Cardenas et al. [44] have experimented with the use of CUSUM in detecting stealthy attacks. Hsio et al. [23] have proposed a distributed security monitoring solution to detect attacks on an ICS. There exists literature on the design of robust ICS [28] , [46] . These works focus on attack modelling and the design of controllers and monitors for secure ICS.
X. CONCLUSION
There exist a number of devices for defending networks and ICS against cyber attacks. Firewalls attempt to prevent attackers from entering an ICS. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) attempt to detect if an unauthorized user has entered the plant network. The approach used in WD is orthogonal to that used in most commercially available firewalls and IDS. WD uses a design-centric approach to detect process anomalies in contrast to network traffic anomalies that are the focus of several IDS. Thus, WD is effective in detecting attacks by an external or an internal agent. One could consider WD as a last-mile defense.
While in the study reported here WD has been found effective in detecting attacks that lead to process anomaly, it does fail in detecting attacks such as a replay attack where a plant operator views the system state that is different from the actual state. This ineffectiveness of WD ought to be considered when using such a system in critical infrastructure.
It is interesting to observe that there exist attacks that are detected by both WD and WDH though vice-versa is not true. For example, attack 17 in Table IV was detected by WDH but not by WD. This observation suggests that, when feasible, both systems ought to be deployed simultaneously.
The invariants used in WD and WDH were derived and coded manually. For a system such as SWaT the manual approach is feasible as the plant has 42 sensors and actuators as compared to perhaps hundreds or more in commercial plants. Thus, there needs to be an automated way of generating and coding the invariants.
The attacks launched by teams during the hackfests could later serve as a source for assessing the effectiveness of attack detection mechanisms developed by other researchers. Details of all attacks launched during the hackfests are therefore made public and available in [9] , [20] , [41] .
It should be obvious that any attack detection mechanism, including WD, is one component of a holistic defense system against cyber attacks on any critical infrastructure. This paper does not address an important question: What action should be taken, and how, when an alarm is raised by WD or WDH?"
This remains an open question.
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